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Summary: This paper analyses the fundamentals of the Portuguese crisis. The
financial crisis of 2007 worsened and triggered the current Portuguese crisis.
We argue that the main problem the economy is facing is its output stagnation
due to a kind of Dutch disease that has created high and increasing levels of
indebtedness, low and decreasing levels of saving and has reduced Portu-
guese competitiveness. Moreover, the existence of a dualist labour market and 
a new wave of emigration produce inefficiency, increasing unemployment of
younger workers and the supply of human capital abroad funded by the Portu-
guese taxpayers. Governance problems such as poor public budget gover-
nance and lack of transparency and accountability are also at stake. These
governance problems must be solved to allow the economy to return to its
long-run growth path.
Key words: Growth, Debt, Saving, Dutch disease, Unemployment, Budget
policy. 






The scope of automatic stabilization is too narrow in the face of a severe recession 
preceded by a long period of sluggish growth (Phillip Anthony O’Hara 2011). The 
elasticity of government receipts with respect to GDP is usually greater than the elas-
ticity of government expenditures. Consequently, during an economic recession the 
automatic deficit tends to increase through government receipts reduction. More ag-
gressive fiscal policies aimed to overcome a severe recession were conducive to 
greater deficits through government expenditures increases but their efficacy remains 
controversial (Alan J. Auerbach, William G. Gale, and Benjamin H. Harris 2010). 
This was the case mainly for the USA when compared with that of European coun-
tries during 2007 crisis. The USA developed more ambitious stimulus plans; never-
theless, the G20 budget deficit was 1% of GDP in 2007 and 9% in 2009. High budget 
deficits led to an unprecedented growth of public debt. This growth, most probably 
acting as a stability buffer for financial institutions, was not risk free when these in-
stitutions sought safer assets. Debt accumulation and its downgrading put financial 
institutions out of the obliged ratios for assets and liabilities, creating a link of cau-
sality from state solvency problems to private institutions. Portuguese financial insti-
tutions are facing that problem. At the same time, the trade-off between consolidation 
and stabilization was destroyed for most of the countries in favor of consolidation 
producing recession episodes (Salvador Barrios, Sven Langedijk, and Lucio Pench 
2010).   
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The main issue faced by Ireland (Constantin Gurdgiev et al. 2011) during the 
financial crisis was the bailout of Anglo Irish and Irish Nationwide Building Society, 
pushing the budget deficit to around 38.5% of GDP in 2010, and leading to an unex-
pected sharp rise in public debt from 65.8% of GDP in 2009 to around 126% of GDP 
in 2011. As for the Portuguese and Greece (Georgios P. Kouretas and Prodromos 
Vlamis 2010) cases, the problem was not the bailout of financial institutions. In Por-
tugal the recent crisis clearly showed problems at two banks that fall in common-
criminal law, not consequences of the financial crisis. 
May 3
rd, 2011 announced a total bailout out of 78 billion Euros for the Portu-
guese economy. This was the result of negotiations between the Portuguese govern-
ment with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Commission and the 
European Central Bank following the request for financial aid made by the Portu-
guese government to the European Commission (EC) on April 6, 2011. As a conse-
quence of the bailout, the Portuguese deficit target is 5.9% of GDP in 2011, and not 
4.6% as previously agreed with the EC. For the next two years it will be 4.5% and 
3% in 2012 and 2013, respectively. Portugal is the third economy asking for financial 
aid in the Euro area. The program was approved by the European Finance Ministers 
on May 16, 2011. The IMF will lend at 3.25% a total of €26 billion and the remain-
ing €52 billion will be lent by the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism and 
European Financial Stabilisation Fund at an average interest rate of 5.7%.  
In this paper we explain the reasons Portugal has fallen into this calamitous 
situation. Several factors led to different, though intertwined problems that were 
conducive to this situation. The first problem is the sluggish Portuguese output 
growth. This problem was due mostly to the lack of structural reforms, namely in the 
labour market, low levels of human capital of the Portuguese labour force, and the 
negative impact of globalization the Portuguese economy suffered from EU Eastern 
enlargement and Chinese accession to the WTO in 2001. The second problem is the 
result of monetary integration associated with poor policies. The decrease of interest 
rates after years of inflation uncertainty and high nominal interest rates created a kind 
of Dutch disease. The degree of public and private indebtedness reached very high 
levels, the saving rate decreased and dangerously trended negative, and price com-
petitiveness deteriorated continuously reducing the rate of output growth. The third 
problem is the lack of accountability and transparency of political governance.  
Based on this framework, rating agencies’ continuous downgrading of Portu-
guese sovereign debt is perfectly comprehensible. Those decisions had implications 
on the devaluation of banking assets, creating the need for capital strengthening and 
forcing most banks to sell participations in other financial and non-financial institu-
tions. Our analysis is consistent with that of the IMF: “The program is built on three 
strong pillars. First, a set of pro-growth measures aimed at making the country com-
petitive again and creating jobs - especially for the young people of Portugal. Sec-
ond, a set of ambitious fiscal measures needed to reduce the public debt and deficit, 
implemented at a pace that is realistic and which allows Portugal the time it needs to 
demonstrate policy implementation and restore market confidence. Third, a set of 
measures aimed at ensuring the stability of Portugal’s financial sector.” (Dominique 
Strauss-Kahn and Olli Rehn 2011). The paper is organized in eight sections. In the  
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first, we present “A Brief History of Portuguese Financial Distress”; next we ques-
tion the “Portuguese Government Size” preceding an inspection of “The Portuguese 
Output Stagnation”; in the fourth section we analyse main impacts of the Portuguese 
“European Integration”; then we view the problem of “Saving and Indebtedness in 
the Portuguese Economy”; sixth, we handle the topic, “External Competitiveness of 
Portuguese Economy”, followed by a brief characterisation of “Labour Market and 
Unemployment Behaviour” and finally, in the eighth section we examine issues con-
cerning Portuguese “Bad Governance: The Problem of Off-Budgeting Practice Mat-
ters”.         
 
1. A Brief History of Portuguese Financial Distress  
 
The Portuguese maritime expansion was so mismanaged by the Portuguese King, 
like Spain with Filipe the Second, that in 1560 (Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. 
Rogoff 2008, 2009), 60 years after the arrival to Brazil, Portugal defaulted on exter-
nal debts with other European countries in the sense used by the authors of default 
followed by rescheduling. From 1828 to 1852, five episodes express the vulnerability 
of the Kingdom's Treasury. In April 1890, Argentina stopped payments to creditors 
and Baring Brothers became insolvent in November 1890. Baring Brothers was an 
important source of financing to the Portuguese government. With the Brazilian cri-
sis between January and April of that year and the persistence of public budget defi-
cits, currency reserves fell by a half and in May the Portuguese experience with a 
gold standard (1854-1891) ended (Luís Aguiar Santos 2001; António Portugal Duarte 
and João Sousa Andrade 2011). In 1892 the Portuguese government stopped pay-
ments and debt rescheduling ended in 1902. Only 1/3 of total debts were paid (Eugé-
nia Mata and Nuno Valério 1994) in the 1920s, external financing of the government 
was closed and the last payment associated with this operation was made in 2001. A 
period of financial instability characterized the post-war period from 1917 to 1926 
with many bank failures. From then until now, the Portuguese economy did not ex-
perience a single bank failure. Of sixty-six countries from 1945 to 2007, only Aus-
tria, Belgium, Portugal and the Netherlands escaped banking crises. Even in 1960 
when the war in Angola began and in 1974 with the Portuguese Revolution there 
were no signs of bank-run. 
From 1926 to 1974, the dictatorial regime that ruled Portugal segregated the 
country at the international level. Portugal was admitted to the United Nations only 
in December 14, 1955 and became a member of the IMF as of March 29, 1961. After 
the declaration of George Marshall at June 5, 1947 the Portuguese government de-
cided not to participate in the Marshall aid, the so-called Economic Recovery Pro-
gram (Fernanda Rollo 1994). Portugal participated only in the creation of the Or-
ganization for European Economic Co-operation, but in September 27, 1948, without 
international reserves in the Central Bank, the Prime Minister Salazar was obliged to 
demand economic and financial aid from the Marshall Plan. As a consequence the 
Portuguese economy had not benefited from the major part of funds. Nevertheless 
from 1949 to 1951 were received in Portugal 70 million dollars. Public infrastructure 
and industrialization benefited from those funds.  
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In 1960, Portugal faced again an external problem due to a shortage of interna-
tional reserves, but the development of the Portuguese tourism sector and emigrants’ 
remittances, especially from France, solved that problem. After the Carnation Revo-
lution (April 25, 1974), Portugal requested assistance from the IMF (1977/78), IMF 
(2011), to solve an urgent problem of public and external deficits associated with 
other serious macroeconomic imbalances such as sharp increases in unemployment, 
pressure from oil prices and a huge inflationary pressure. The first credit tranche ar-
rived in 1977 and the second in 1978. IMF financial help ascended to €111 million at 
current exchange rate. A second financial aid was requested by Portugal to the IMF 
in 1983. Once again, nothing new occurred, the same known problems emerged: high 
public and external deficits. The total financing this time was €555 million. Despite 
the recognized success of these two aid plans (for the first see Hans O. Schmitt 
1981), external conditions of the Portuguese economy evolved in such a virtuous 
way that the Portuguese authorities did not need to meet the accorded programs in 
terms of the agreed instruments. 
 
2. Portuguese Government Size  
 
Are average government indicators pointing to a Portuguese macroeconomic situa-
tion that would evolve to a sovereign debt default?  
Table 1 gives information about government size (ratio of expenditures over 
GDP, %) for European Union with 27 members, Euro area with 12 members that are 
representatives of a stronger fiscal policy discipline, and Germany and France, the 
two major members of the Euro area and the three countries under fiscal and debt 
stress, Ireland, Greece and Portugal. The ratio of total expenditure of general gov-
ernment over GDP gives information about government size. The general govern-
ment sector comprises central government, state government, local government, and 
social security funds. 
 
Table 1   Ratio of Expenditures to GDP (%) 
 
 Germany  France  Ireland  Greece  Portugal  E27  Euro12 
1988-90 43.8 49.3 44.5 41.5 37.0     
1995-97 50.8 54.3 39.0 44.9 41.6 50.1 51.0 
2002-04 47.9 53.0 33.4 45.1 43.6 46.9 47.7 
2008-10 46.0 55.1 53.0 50.7 48.4 49.4 49.6 
 
Source: AMECO1, UTAO (2011), and authors’ calculation. 
 
Two main conclusions can be drawn from Table 1 above. Portugal and Greece 
are the countries for which expenditure has never been reduced for the chosen peri-
ods and Portugal has a level of expenditure less than the average of E27 and Euro12 
and near the value of Germany. Based on this indicator it's difficult to find out an 
excessive size for the Portuguese government. 
 
                                                        
1 Annual Macro-ECOnomic database (AMECO) - annual macro-economic database of the European 
Commission's Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (http://ec.europa.eu/economy 
_finance/db_indicators/ameco/index_en.htm).  
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Since February 1992, the future members of the European Monetary Union 
knew the general conditions about deficit and debt values. Table 2 below exhibits the 
occurrences of excessive deficit and positive budget balance for Euro12, Germany, 
France, Ireland, Greece and Portugal haven't had limits before the current crisis, from 
1995 to 2007. 
 
Table 2   Occurrences of Excessive Deficit and Positive Budget Balance  
 
  Excessive deficit  Positive budget balance 
EU12  (3) 1995-1996 and 2003  2000 
Germany  (6) 1995-1996, 2002-2005  2000 
France  (6) 1995-1997, 2002-2204   
Ireland (0)  1997-2001,  2003-2007 
Greece (13)  1995-2007   
Portugal  (9) 1995-1998, 2001, 2003-2006   
 
Source: AMECO, UTAO (2011), and authors’ calculation. 
 
A positive balance was registered in 2000 for Euro12 and Germany. For 1997-
2001 and 2003-2007, Ireland has registered successive positive budget balances. Six 
times, Germany and France had deficits greater than 3%. The Euro area is an exam-
ple of moral hazard created by its leaders. The assumed Euro authority in these 
countries is very weak in historical and moral terms (see also Miroslav Prokopijević 
2010). In Germany the Constitutional amendment introduced in 2009 will impose 
structural budget balances equilibria at the Federal level in 2016 and at the Länders 
level in 2020 (Federal Ministry of Finance 2009; Lars P. Feld and Thushyanthan 
Baskaran 2010). 
Very high values for public debt, doubling the limit of 60% for many coun-
tries, influenced the recent turmoil in sovereign financial markets. At the end of 2010 
(UTAO 2011), the highest level was registered by Greece (142.8%), followed by 
Italy (119%), Ireland (96.2%), Belgium (96.8%) and Portugal (93%). The value for 
the Euro area at 17 was 85.1%, meaning that the Portuguese value is higher but not 
very far from the average of this area. Note that Ireland reduced its level of public 
debt from 1987 to 2007. 
The problem with the Portuguese economy is neither about average values in-
dicators nor about a long term view of fiscal sustainability. Carlos Fonseca Marin-
heiro (2006) has confirmed sustainability using the conventional unit root and co-
integration analysis. But the problem at stake for the Portuguese economy should not 
be identified with a kind of long term decision by capital markets based on past data. 
Instead it should be envisaged as a situation of lending rupture created by forward 
expectations. The same comment applies to the “rule” of the 90% threshold value of 
debt: lower than the threshold does not affect growth but greater has negative impli-
cations (Cristina Checherita and Philipp Rother 2010; Reinhart and Rogoff 2010). 
We will try to explain why the Portuguese economy is in a situation of rupture and 
why financial aid is necessary.  
 
3. The Portuguese Output Stagnation  
 
In order to understand the Portuguese output path we analyse the evolution of output 
in terms of growth rates and actual levels for 1960-2010. Considering these two vari-
ables we get a more accurate understanding of the evolution of the economy. The  
200  João Sousa Andrade and Adelaide Duarte 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2011, 2, pp. 195-218 
Portuguese economy experienced past growth rates typical to emerging economies. 
For the period 1969-73, the average GDP growth was 8.2% (Table 3).  
 









Source: AMECO and authors’ calculation. 
 
In the first years of European integration (1986-90), the growth rate attained 
6.6%, a result in accordance with growth predictions of real convergence since Por-
tuguese real income was only a percentage of the real income of the EU12 economy 
(Maria Adelaide Duarte and Marta Cristina N. Simões 2002). But Portuguese diver-
gence from EU started in 2001 since growth became anaemic during the last nine 
years. The growth trend rate for the Portuguese economy was computed using the H-




Source: AMECO and authors’ calculation. 
 
 
Figure 1  Growth Trend Rate (H-P) for the Portuguese Economy 
  
To obtain H-P trend values we have used  =100 to a new series increased 4 
periods by an ARIMA model chosen by the Schwarz criteria. The picture of Portu-
guese growth rate decline is very clear. The exception is for the first years following 
the European integration. The last phase of decline starts in 1999.  
But the beginning of this last phase doesn't coincide with the above one if we 















 1965  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005  2010
1963 - 2010
Growth rate H-P 
201  The Fundamentals of the Portuguese Crisis 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2011, 2, pp.195-218
 
Source: AMECO and authors’ calculation. 
 
 
Figure 2  GDP H-P Trend 
  
In the figure above output stagnation clearly starts in 2002. Table 4 expresses 
the actual stagnation of the Portuguese economy.  
 
Table 4   Trend Growth Rates 
 





Source: AMECO and authors’ calculation. 
 
The evidence of output stagnation since 2002 pushed our analysis further in 
order to forecast the output trend gap for 2010. Due to the atypical GDP behavior in 
the period following the Carnation Revolution, we forecasted the values of the GDP 
trend (H-P) based on 1978 to 2001 for the years 2002 to 2010. The model used for 
this projection, with trend GDP in logs, includes a constant, a time trend and the 
lagged value of the dependent variable. The AR1 model allows us to take into ac-
count the inertia of output trend evolution. We used the Jae H. Kim (2009) procedure 
for R that applies the bias correction of Paul Shaman and Robert A. Stine (1988) 
caused by auto-regressive estimations and the correction of Lutz Kilian (1998) for 
the confidence intervals of the forecast, for which were made 1000 bootstrap itera-
tions, to obtain 90% confidence intervals.  
The new series for the GDP trend augmented with trend forecast for 2002-


















 1965  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005  2010
1963 - 2010
GDP Trend 
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Source: AMECO and authors’ calculation. 
 
 
Figure 3  GDP Trend Correction (A) and (B) 
 
The existence of sluggish growth is now perfectly obvious (Figure 3B). 
Nouriel Roubini (2011) recognises the dependence from growth for the success of 
the stabilisation program of May 4. For him the lack of growth of the Portuguese 
economy is the most important problem that the country is faced with. 
The usual method of trend calculation hides a grim reality for Portugal that 
can be seen in the values of output gap (Table 5). 
 
Table 5   Output Gap Values in % 
 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Gap -0.19  1.16  0.20  -3.43  -3.30 
GapC -8.58  -9.26  -12.26  -17.90  -19.66 
 
Source: AMECO and authors’ calculation. 
   
By the usual calculation, the negative gap is inexistent in 2008 (0.2%) but by 
our calculation the gap is 12%. And in 2010 the value is near 20%. This gives a bleak 
picture of the Portuguese economy that also has consequences at the level of the 
budget deficit corrected by cyclical output fluctuations. This applies to the correction 
based on H-P filter and also based on the production function because this last 
method depends essentially on that filter in input calculations (European Community 
1995; and Francesca D'Auria et al. 2010 in the European Union). If we don’t correct 
the trend in terms of using two trends, an effective one and a desired one, the indica-
tors of fiscal policy can be very misleading. Using only the first one we are prone to 
advise restrictive discretionary fiscal policies while the economy has already substan-
tial positive budget balances, after the correction of cyclical fluctuations by the sec-
ond (desired) trend. 
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4. European Integration: Inflation Convergence and the Dutch 
Disease 
 
Inflation convergence was necessary to Portuguese Euro-area membership. The Por-
tuguese inflation convergence process occurred at a fast pace. After the Carnation 
Revolution Portugal experienced a process of high and unstable inflation (see Figure 
4). For 1984-85 the average rate of inflation, measured by the CPI, was 21.76%, in 
1990-91 it was 11.56%, and 2.59% in 1999-2000. From 1977 to 1990 the Portuguese 
Central Bank applied a policy of bank credit rationing with a crawling-peg exchange 
rate policy. In the last years of that reform (1990) there were many exceptions to the 
target level of banking credit and interest rates and credit needed to reflect market 
conditions. In 1991 the Bank of Portugal started a policy of targeting the value of the 
exchange rate of the Deutsche Mark, equivalent to a policy of revaluing the Portu-
guese Escudo to control and reduce the inflation rate. This is a policy that presents 
potential long-run drawbacks that can hamper growth in the future. Sergio Rebelo 
and Carlos A. Vegh (1995) shows that this kind of policy is more effective to control 
inflation in the short run than the conventional monetary policy, but has greater costs 
in the long run resulting from the loss of price competitiveness.   
 
 
Source: INE (Portuguese National Statistical Institute).2 
 
 
Figure 4  Annual Inflation Rate (CPI) from 1973:1 to 2002:4 
 
In order to estimate the uncertainty associated with the evolution of inflation 
we used an AR(1) model with an ARCH(2) structure of errors estimated by maxi-
mum-likelihood. Any GARCH structure tested was rejected. The model is indicated 
below and has 3 equations: equation (1) models the autoregressive for the inflation 
rate ( ); equation (2) models the error term, where  has a normal distribution 
(0,1); and equation (3) models conditional variance. 
 
                                                        









 1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000
1973:1 - 2002:4 
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01 1 · tt t          (1)
 






· tj t j
j
   

    (3)
 
Table 6   ML-ARCH(2) 1971:2-2010:4 (T = 159) 
 
D4LIPC Coefficient  Std.  error  Z  p-value 
Constant       0.00167751     0.00116407      1.441    0.1496   
D4LIPC_1    0.942320       0.0125731      74.95     0.0000*** 
alpha(0)    6.32146e-05    1.51812e-05     4.164    3.13e-05*** 
alpha(1)    0.384639       0.137367        2.800    0.0051*** 
alpha(2)    0.615361       0.147744        4.165    3.11e-05*** 
 
Notes: Log-likelihood 442.7605; Likelihood ratio test for (G)ARCH terms: Chi-square(2) = 85.5511 [2.64738e-19]. 
 
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
  
The estimated model (Table 6) allows us to calculate the conditional variance 
and to analyse what happened in terms of uncertainty (Figure 5). 
 
 
Source: INE and authors’ calculation based on model (1)-(3). 
 
 
Figure 5  Conditional Variance Errors and Squared Root Associated to Inflation 
 
As we can see (Figure 5), we can split the uncertainty path into two periods: 
from 1970 to 1990 and from 1990 to 2010. This evolution is interpreted in terms of 
monetary policy change and credit market operations. The interest rates begin to per-
sistently decrease (Figure 6) after 1990. The consequences were obvious: a huge real 
growth of monetary aggregates, the real annual growth rate of M1 from 1997:1 to 
1999:4 was between 10.4% and 18.3%. Also note that never before did Portuguese 













 1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005  2010  2015
residual
+- sqrt(h(t)) 
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Figure 6  Short-Run Interest Rate (Bank Lending to Non-Financial Firms from 6 Months to 1 Year) 
 
In 10 years, nominal interest rates fell to a quarter and real interest rates to a 
fifth of their 1990 value (Table 7). This was a sudden change no one, individual or 
firm, could resist.  
 
Table 7   Short Run Interest Rates (Quarterly Averages) 
 
Years  Nominal (%)  Real (%) 
1990 - 1991  23.1  10.3 
1995 - 1996  12.1  8.2 
1999 - 2000  5.3  2.6 
2000 - 2001  5.8  2.1 
 
Source: Banco de Portugal, Boletim Estatístico; Authors’ calculation. 
 
As mentioned before, Portuguese inflation convergence toward the level of 
that of the European countries with the lowest inflation was the result of a real ex-
change rate appreciation policy. At the same time the process of financial integration 
had also an enormous impact on Portuguese macroeconomic disequilibrium’s. In 
December 1992 financial transfers with the EU were totally liberalized by the initia-
tive of Braga de Macedo, the Finance Minister. Current account exchange rate trans-
fers were allowed for Europe only in 1964. The liberalization of capital movements, 
access to a massive market supply of funds, a context of decreasing inflation expecta-
tions and reduced inflation uncertainty resulted in an impressive reduction of interest 
rates, a sustainable decrease of domestic savings and in a continuous increase of in-
ternal and external indebtedness. This situation fostered a kind of Dutch disease. The 
concept of Dutch disease emerged in The Economist (1977) and the seminal papers 
by Warner Max Corden and Peer J. Neary (1982) and Corden (1984). Meanwhile, 
                                                        
3AMECO. Real effective exchange rates, based on unit labour costs (total economy), performance rela-







 1990  1995  2000  2005  2010
%
1990:1 - 2010:4 
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other sources have been envisaged to explain the so called disease: external remit-
tances (Beja Jr Edsel 2010); international aid (Karel Verbeke 2007; Raghuram G. 
Rajan and Arvind Subramanian 2011); and the phenomena of real exchange rate ap-
preciation (Christopher Adam 2005; UNCTAD - South Centre 2007). In what con-
cerns Portuguese net transfers from EU, they reached 2.6% of GDP in 1996-99 and 
they decreased ever since: to 1.5% in 2004-07 and 1.3% in 2008-10. This aid was 
applied mostly in infrastructure investments. A majority of papers supports the idea 
that public investment has a positive effect on long-run output (David Aschauer 
1989; William Easterly and Rebelo 1993). However the estimated effect is often 
small or negligible and too dependent on the methodologies employed (Alessandro 
Turrini 2004). Antonio Afonso and Miguel St. Aubyn (2008) concluded for the pe-
riod 1960-2005, that Portuguese public investment has not had a crowding out effect 
on private investment but at best the effect does not differ from null at 95% confi-
dence intervals. Its total rate of return is negative for Portugal (as well as for Austria, 
Finland, Greece and Sweden). We can conclude that the policy of real exchange rate 
appreciation, EU structural funds and an impressive reduction of interest rates, 
altogether were major sources of the Portuguese Dutch disease that explain its spread 
that manifested mainly in accruing indebtedness and lacking external competitive-
ness of the Portuguese economy. 
 
5. Saving and Indebtedness in the Portuguese Economy 
 
The intertemporal constraint of individuals and firms was very much relieved. With a 
rate of interest increasingly lower than the rate of time preference, why would indi-
viduals continue to save? 
When we compare the saving rate (the ratio of National Saving to GDP) of 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal, from 1990 to 2008 we see that Ireland had maintained 
reasonable values of savings while Greece and Portugal after 1994 had continually 
reduced their savings (Pedro Bação and Duarte 2011).  
As observed (Table 8) the low level of savings for Greece and Portugal repre-
sent a clear indication that future problems to debt payments would most probably 
occur.  
The low value of savings is the other side of the Portuguese external current 
account disequilibrium. It is clear that for Portugal we also have a twin deficit prob-
lem (Martin S. Feldstein 1999) with adverse effects on real exchange rate that affect 
both external competitiveness and growth of the Portuguese economy. 
The low value of Portuguese savings was considered normal in the early years 
of its integration to the EU; it was the consequence of a process of capital integration 
in a more developed area (Olivier Blanchard and Francesco Giavazzi 2002) but some 
time later, it was taken as an indicator of a serious external imbalance (Blanchard 
2007). 
The level of debts in the Portuguese economy has grown without any relation 
with the growth of output or incomes. Real growth rates (deflated by GDP implicit 
price level) and the ratios of indebtedness for general government, financial and non-
financial corporations and households, and assets of the rest of the world (RW) are 
shown in Table 9. 
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Source: AMECO and authors’ calculation.
 
 
Figure 7  Ratio of National Savings for Greece, Ireland and Portugal 
 
Table 8   National Saving Ratio of GDP 
 
S/Y (%)  Greece  Ireland  Portugal 
1973-73 33.4  20.9  29.4 
1989-90 17.9  16.2  22.7 
2009-10 2.9  10.9  8.7 
 
Source: AMECO and authors’ calculation. 
 
Table 9   Total Liabilities of Portuguese Institutional Agents and RW Assets (%) 
 
 ST  LT TOTAL ST/Y LT/Y Total/Y  ST LT TOTAL ST/Y LT/Y  Total/Y 
1996 2.9 10.7 8.0 52.7 101.6 154.3  -4.9 9.1 6.2 6.4 26.9 33.2 
1997 0.5 42.3 29.9 50.8 148.5 199.3  -10.7 33.3 26.3 5.5 36.0 41.4 
1998 9.2 12.7 11.8 53.0 160.6 213.6  13.6 16.0 15.7 6.0 40.2 46.1 
1999 14.9  8.1 9.8 59.1 167.2 226.4 29.3 14.4 16.4 7.7 44.5 52.2 
2000 7.1  10.7 9.8 61.1 179.1 240.2 5.4 18.3 16.5 7.8 51.5 59.3 
2001 5.9 10.4 9.2 63.6 194.8 258.4  39.4 22.6 25.0 11.3 63.3 74.7 
2002 -1.7  6.5 4.6 62.0 206.5 268.6 9.0 14.1 13.3 12.3 72.3 84.7 
2003 6.6  4.4 4.9 66.9 217.8 284.7  11.5 7.3 7.9 14.0 78.5 92.5 
2004 6.4  0.8 2.1 70.2 216.2 286.4  27.7 -4.2 1.3 18.1 74.2 92.3 
2005  1.4  5.6 4.6 70.7 227.0 297.7 11.1 8.9 9.4 20.1 80.5 100.6 
2006 -5.3  7.0 4.2 66.1 240.0 306.1  -14.8 8.6 4.3 17.1 86.5 103.6 
2007 4.8  8.3 7.6 67.7 254.8 322.5 6.6 9.6 9.1 17.8 92.9  110.8 
2008 7.5  6.5 6.7 73.0 271.8 344.8 6.4 8.7 8.3 19.0 101.3  120.3 
2009 1.8  8.5 7.1 76.2 303.7 379.9  12.6 12.5 12.5 22.1 117.8  140.0 
2010 -3.1  2.0 1.0 73.0 306.1 379.1  -14.0 -3.7 -5.3 19.0 112.1  131.2 
1995-07 4.4  10.6 8.9 10.3 13.2 12.6    
 
Notes: ST: short term securities other than shares excluding derivatives + financial derivatives + short term loans + trade 
credit and advances; LT: long term securities other than shares excluding derivatives + long term loans; The first two col-
umns are real growth rates; The GDP implicit price index was used to deflate the nominal series. 
 
Source: Banco de Portugal, Boletim Estatístico, Financial Accounts; Authors’ calculation.  
    
The average annual growth rate of total debt for the period 1995-2007 was al-
most 9%. However this situation is far from the situation of Mexico in 1994-95, East 
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Dilip Ratha 2000; Robert N. McCauley and Jens Zukunft 2008) since short-term as-
sets of the rest of the world were only 19% in 2010 (see also Essahbi Essaadi, Jamel 
Jouini, and Walih Khallouli 2009). 
The growth of total long-term debts is 2.5 greater than that of short-term and 
in levels, long-term debt is more than 4 times the level of short-term debt. Even in 
2008-2010 debt growth in the Portuguese economy was considerable. The last col-
umn shows the fragility of the Portuguese economy; from 1996 to 2010 the level of 
indebtedness was multiplied by 2.5. This indebtedness growth is incompatible with 
the sluggish evolution of the economy (see Section 3). 
The ratio of total debt from abroad to GDP has grown 4 times from 1996 to 
2010 and the average real growth of debt from 1997 to 2001 was 20%. Table 10 pre-
sents debt securities by sources of institutional debtors. The government is the most 
significant debtor even if its position has decreased since 2005. The most recent re-
duction, for 2010, is naturally due to increasing difficulties to sell securities abroad 
and also to off-budgets expenditures (see below). Actually it is difficult to say what 
really happened: the debts of the financial institutions reflect the growing need for 
funds to buy public debt and a not negligible part of other residents’ debt are debt of 
public firms or guaranteed by the state. 
 
Table 10 International Investment Position: Institutional Debtors of Securities 
 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
General government  70.9  79.8 80.9 80.7 71.4 70.1 71.3 
Other monetary financial institutions 26.8 17.8 14.5 16.3 20.2 16.3 13.7 
Other resident sectors  2.3  2.4 4.6 3.1 8.3  13.6  15.0 
  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
   
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
General government  74.4  78.3 75.5 68.1 64.9 60.0 58.3 
Other monetary financial institutions 10.7  1.7  0.4  14.8 20.8 27.4 26.0 
Other resident sectors  14.9  20.0 24.1 17.1 14.4 12.6 15.7 
  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: Banco de Portugal, Boletim Estatístico, Balance of Payments Accounts. 
 
6. External Competitiveness of the Portuguese Economy 
 
In the second half of 1980, Pierre Bérégovoy, French Finance Minister and later 
Prime Minister, advocated the idea of competitive disinflation (Christian de Boissieu 
and Jean Pisani-Ferry 1995; Frederic Lordon 1998). It was recognized that with ir-
revocably fixed exchange rates an economy would be more competitive if its infla-
tion rate was lower than that of its competitors. That idea has never been considered 
by Portuguese policy makers. Figure 8 express what happened in terms of implicit 
prices, dividing the Portuguese series by the German series (A), and in terms of the 
real effective exchange rate (B). 
The implicit price level of Portuguese GDP measured in Euros has an increas-
ing trend in relation to German implicit prices. This evolution of relative prices is an 
incentive to imports and a disincentive to exports. This same evolution is confirmed 
by the evolution of the real exchange rate. From 1986 to 2010 the Portuguese im-
plicit real effective exchange rate suffered a real appreciation of 100% in terms of 
German values. From 2000 to 2010 the appreciation was also high, at 20%. This last  
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result was also confirmed in Fernando Alexandre et al. (2009). How can an economy 
with a technological level that is far from the technological leaders resist this evolu-
tion? The obvious consequence of this loss of external competitiveness was the ex-
ternal current balance disequilibrium and also the low level of savings and a sluggish 
output evolution.  
 
Portuguese GDP implicit prices relative to Germany 
 
 
Real effective exchange rate, Portugal and Germany 
 
Source: AMECO and authors’ calculation. 
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 “Portugal’s share in the world exports, particularly in goods, has substantially 
shrunk since the early nineties; also, compared to 1990, unlike the majority of the 
other EU member states, the ratio of exports of goods and services to GDP was re-
duced, and in 2005, well below EU averages” (Joaquim Ramos Silva 2008, p. 53). 
Even if “exports of goods are shifting from low to medium (low and high) technol-
ogy products, traditionally uncompetitive products of textiles, clothing and footwear 
have significantly lost weight in the total” (Silva 2008, p. 53). For João Ferreira do 
Amaral (2006), Portugal in the second half of the nineties has suffered from the 
greatest negative shock in peacetime resulting from the emergence of countries such 
as China and India and the EU membership of Eastern European countries. In the 
absence of structural transformations Portugal (like Italy) was very vulnerable to 
those competitors, “Italy and Portugal entered EMU with industrial structures that 
placed them directly in China’s line of fire.” (Alan Ahearne and Jean Pisani-Ferry 
2006, p. 4). In this international setting of free movement of goods, the worst that 
could happen at the national level was a real exchange rate appreciation, and indeed 
it occurred.  
 
7. Labour Market and Unemployment Behaviour 
 
Perhaps the best way to characterize the Portuguese labour market is to consider it as 
an apartheid situation (Andrew Eatwell 2010). The definition in Council of the Euro-
pean Union (2011) suits the Portuguese labour market very well, “large differences 
in relative levels of employment protection legislation contributes to a division be-
tween well-protected workers with permanent contracts and less-protected workers 
with atypical, mostly temporary, contracts. The impact of the crisis has highlighted 
this issue: job losses for workers in temporary work were almost four times higher 
than for those in permanent employment.” (p. 11). 
During the last years the Portuguese labour market has experienced a down-
ward trend of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
EPL index (Employment Protection Legislation) like some other economies in the 
European Union. In 2008 the Labour Code was revised and some measures were 
taken in order to facilitate its application by reducing procedural court processes, 
increasing trial periods and also reducing notice time and compensation for no-fault 
dismissal (OECD 2010). The effects of these changes coincided with unemployment 
rate increase so the results of these changes have to be analyzed with caution.  
  
Table 11 Unemployment Rate for Several Countries 
 
 2000  2010 
EU – 27  8.7  9.6 
Euro area  8.5  10.1 
Ireland 4.2  13.7 
Greece 11.2  12.6 
Spain 11.1  20.1 
Portugal 4.0  11.0 
Austria 3.6  4.4 
U.S.A. 4.0  9.6 
  
Source: Eurostat4. 
                                                        
4 European Commission. Eurostat.Unemployment rate. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/ 
portal/eurostat/home.  
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The worst situations in terms of unemployment rate increases are reckoned by 
Portugal and Ireland (Table 11). The unemployment rate from 2000 to 2010 was 
multiplied by 3. The unemployment rate for Austria is in 2010 the value of that rate 
in 2000 for Portugal and Ireland. 
Historically, the unemployment rate in Portugal is not very different from that 
of the USA, but two differences are hidden in those numbers (Blanchard and Pedro 
Portugal 2001). The duration of unemployment in Portugal is three times that of the 
USA and the relative flow of workers into unemployment in the USA is three times 
that of Portuguese workers. 
In Figure 9 (A) and (B) we present the total unemployment rate and the unem-
ployment rate for workers less than 25 years old (A) and the logs of the actual num-





Note: In (B) we have logs of workers in thousands. 
Source: INE.  
 
 





























Seeking time=>25 months 
212  João Sousa Andrade and Adelaide Duarte 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2011, 2, pp. 195-218 
Unemployment rate path exhibits three main characteristics: its increase after 
2002 (A) with the youth unemployment rate increasing more than the total rate (A) 
and the increase of long duration unemployed workers (B).  
The employment/unemployment data is obtained by inquiry based on the cen-
sus made every 10 years. This means that during the 1990’s the immigration from 
Latin America (Brazil), ex-Portuguese colonies and Eastern European countries was 
actually on the labour force supply but not reflected in the employment inquiry. Ac-
cording to the inquiry, in 2006 the total labour force supply was 5601.4 thousands 
and immigrants numbered 437.126 thousands, 7.8% of the official value of the la-
bour supply (João Peixoto and Catarina Sabino 2009). As a consequence the actual 
unemployment rate was lower than the official rate. Moreover, as Portugal is tradi-
tionally an emigration country this also has consequences on its unemployment rate. 
Portugal had three waves of emigration since 1850: at the end of 19
th century, the 
second and biggest one in the 1960’s and the third beginning in 2002 (Alvaro Santos 
Pereira 2001). The European Union’s freedom of movement created a problem for 
migration statistics in Portugal. Based on Pereira (2010) calculations, emigration was 
108,388 and 101,595 in 2007 and 2008, respectively and from 2002 to 2008 the total 
value was 542,808. The present wave differs from the two previous waves by the 
higher education level of the new Portuguese emigrants, representing an effective 
brain drain (Pereira and Pedro Lains 2010). If at the end of 2010 we count these emi-
grants since 2002 as unemployed searching for employment, the unemployment rate 
11.1% is undervalued; it ascends to 18.9%. The emigration phenomenon is known in 
Portugal as an “exhaust valve”, as is confirmed by this calculation. The unemploy-
ment rate can be a bad indicator of the output gap as well as a bad social welfare in-
dicator. We can conclude that the sluggish growth of the Portuguese economy has 
terrible effects in terms of unemployment. 
 
8. Bad Governance: The Problem of Off-Budgeting Practice 
Matters 
 
Voters may not understand the significance of many forms of off-budget expendi-
tures but not capital markets. For example, Freitas Diogo do Amaral (2011) has 
stressed the inexistence of specific laws for public foundations. The government does 
not know the exact number of these institutions but they are dependent of public 
funds, as indeed private foundations. The XIII and XIV constitutional government of 
António Guterres (1995-2002) created many institutes with financial and administra-
tive autonomy with the aim of making more efficient public decisions fleeing the 
constraints of state bureaucracy. Years later a parallel state structure was really in 
place. A part of their receipts is off-budget and their liabilities are not aggregated in 
the general government accounts. The debts of public and semi public firms created 
by central and local public administrations are guaranteed by the state but are not 
aggregated at the national public debt. The accumulated debt of non-financial firms 
owned by the state at the end of 2009 was 24.3% of the GDP, and in 2010 it is ap-
proximately 26% (Pereira 2010).  
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In the last years, public-private partnerships (PPP) at the level of road and rail 
infrastructure and also hospital buildings and the associated production of health ser-
vices became a very controversial subject. PPPs are an alternative to traditional pub-
lic investment; they allow to keep these expenditures off-budget and to postpone the 
payment to the PPP operator in a yearly basis (Turrini 2004). This practice can hide 
inefficient projects and future commitments that are kept aside from the voters. Some 
of these contracts were renegotiated but always with more charges incurred by the 
state. Based on 2009 as reference year (Finanças 2010), Table 12 shows the future 
costs from PPP. As we can see these costs represent with reference to 2010 1% by 
year of GDP. From 2011 to 2030 the total cost will be 20.9% of 2010 GDP, which is 
a huge amount of expenditures. The report for 2010 (Finanças 2011) doesn’t publish 
the future costs of PPP. 
 
Table 12 PPP Future Costs in % of GDP (2010) 
 






Source: Finanças (2010) and authors’ calculation. 
 
More important than the public debt level is the absence of credible informa-
tion about state liabilities, direct or indirect, like future liabilities associated to PPP 
expenditures already discussed that endangers capital markets confidence on Portu-
guese economy. 
And finally we want to stress recent opportunist policies in a context of fiscal 
consolidation. The dates of recognition of an excessive deficit and for abrogating that 
decision were: 2002-04, 2005-08 and 2009-? (see for Portugal EC 2005a,b; EC 
2009a,b). For all the excessive deficit processes: EC 2011. In 2008, using the data 
then recognized by Portugal and Eurostat, Portugal exit an excessive deficit situation 
by implementing rigorous control of public expenditures and receipts. Political 
measures such as VAT reduction from 21% to 20% (30
th May 2008) and public sec-
tor wages increase of 2.9% in 2009 due to elections to the Portuguese parliament, 
European Parliament and local governments, were important signs that fiscal con-




We have portrayed Portuguese economy tracing a general picture whose main char-
acteristics are a situation diagnosed as a kind of Dutch disease since the second half 
of the 1990’s, with a systematic decrease of its savings and suffering from the impact 
of globalization and loss of external competitiveness following from a stagnated out-
put since 2002. 
We have also concluded that the output gap and the unemployment rate have 
to be interpreted carefully. A new output trend was calculated in order to correct the 
recent actual Portuguese sluggish growth. The third wave of emigration has reduced 
the actual labour supply value resulting in the decrease of the unemployment rate.  
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Additionally, high unemployment rates express a situation of apartheid in the labour 
market and low skills of older workers.  
Sluggish growth means less budget receipts and the government reaction to 
this was to develop off-budget practices and to create public firms to hide the in-
creased disequilibrium between expenditures and receipts. The development of a 
parallel government structure, with the creation of public firms at the central and lo-
cal governments, to employ party elements and pay them out of public administration 
salaries has also contributed to a real problem of lack of transparency and account-
ability. Why would international financial markets and rating agencies ignore this 
situation and these facts?  
The Portuguese problems will be solved only with output growth. The simple 
rule for inter-temporal budget constraints states that debt can only be sustainable if 
real output growth is greater than the real interest rate. With an interest rate of 5.1 
(more or less the average of the financial aid to the Portuguese economy), output has 
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